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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KABUL 6840

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, PGOV, PINR, UR, AF
SUBJECT: THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION CONTINUES TO DEVOUR ITS OWN
CHILDREN

REF: KABUL 6669

1. SUMMARY: THE ARRESTS OF MAJOR GENERAL ABDUL QADER, FORMER
DEFENSE MINISTER, AND LT. GENERAL SHAHPOOR, FORMER CHIEF OF THE
GENERAL STAFF, HAVE PROVOKED NO OVERT POLITICAL OR
MILITARY REACTION AS YET, AND THE CIVILIAN AFGHAN LEADERSHIP APPEARS
TO REMAIN IN CONTROL OF THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF POWER, THE MILITARY.
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SIMILARLY, THE AUGUST 23 ARRESTS OF PLANNING MINISTER SULTAN ALI
KISHTMAND AND PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER MOHAMMAD RAFIE
HAVE NOT BEEN CHALLENGED PUBLICLY. THE BIG WINNER IN THIS AFFAIR
SEEMS TO BE HAFIZULLAH AMIN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN
MINISTER , WHO IS AMBITIOUS, RUTHLESS, PRO-SOVIET, AND SUSPICIOUS
OF THE WEST. THE REGIME'S BASE OF SUPPORT, BY REMOVING THE
PARCHAMISTS AND THE QADER SUPPORTERS, HAS BECOME EVEN NARROWER AND

IS NOW ESSENTIALLY COMPOSED OF A TIGHT GROUPING OF PRO-AMIN KHALQISTS, HIGHLY PLACED PARTY SYMPATHIZERS IN THE AFGHAN MILITARY, AND SEVERAL THOUSAND SOVIET ADVISERS WHO PERMEATE THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACIES. US. INTERESTS COULD SUFFER TO SOME DEGREE SHOULD THE ELIMINATION OF THE LEFTIST-NATIONALIST ELEMENT IN A FURTHER LEFTWARD AND PRO-USSR DRIFT BY THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. "TREASONOUS GUILT" OF ARRESTED MINISTERS REMAINS UN-SUBSTANTIATED

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THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SINCE THE COUP OF 27 APRIL, OPPOSITION GROUPS HAVE ARISEN AND BEEN CONSPIRING TO OVERTHROW THE FOUR-MONTH-OLD REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. THOUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AMIN AND HIS COHORTS HAVE EXPRESSED IRRITATION AND CONCERN ABOUT THESE CHALLENGES TO THEIR "POPULAR" RULE. THE INITIAL ARRESTS, WHICH BEGAN ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO, INCLUDED MOSTLY MEDICAL DOCTORS AT KABUL'S MAIN HOSPITAL AND AT KABUL UNIVERSITY, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER EDUCATORS AT THE UNIVERSITY. AMONG THE ARRESTED WAS DR. MIR ALI AKBAR, PRESIDENT OF JAMHURIAT HOSPITAL. GIVEN THE PROFESSIONS OF THESE PARTICULAR DESTAIEES, IT APPEARED AT THAT TIME THAT THEY POSED LITTLE SERIOUS SECURITY TRHEAT TO THE REGIME, ALTHOUGH WE HAD RELIABLE REPORT THAT THEY INDEED HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN POLTTING.

3. AT SOME POINT, HOWEVER, THE REGIME (PROMPTED EITHER BY EVIDENCE IT HAD UNCOVERED, OR BY A DESIRE TO STRIKE PERMANENTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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AT PERCEIVED POTENTIAL RIVALS) MADE THE CRITICAL DECISION TO MOVE AGAINST CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, INCLUDING DEFENSE MINISTER QADER AND CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF SHAHPOOR. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS REPORTS THAT SOME 350 MILITARY OFFICERS WERE ARRESTED IN THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION.

4. THE GROUNDWORK FOR THIS MOVE WAS CAREFULLY LAID BY THE REGIME, AS EVIDENCED BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY DISCERNABLE OVERT RESISTANCE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES (AS OF THE MOMENT, AT LEAST). A SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC SPEECHES (MOST NOTABLY ONE GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER NOOR MOHAMMED TARAKI ON AUGUST 15 TO AIR FORCE OFFICERS) OVER THE FEW DAYS PRECEEDING THE AUGUST 17 ARRESTS CONTAINED SEVERAL GENERAL THEMES SUCH AS: MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY MUST OBEY PARTY DISCIPLINE EVEN MORE THAN MILITARY DISCIPLINE; THEIR LOYALTY SHOULD NOT BE TO INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS, BUT TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE IN GENERAL; AND THE REVOLUTION FACES THREATS FROM DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SUPPORTERS OF "BALCKREACTION (I.E. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE CONSERVATIVE MULLAHS) AND IMPERIALISM" WHICH HAS TO BE COMPLETELY STAMPED OUT. HAVING DELIVERED THE MESSAGE THAT,COME WHAT MAY, THE REGIME'S CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP EXPECTED

THE ARMED FORCES TO FOLLOW PARTY ORDERS, THE AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED

ON AUGUST 17 THAT QADER, SHHPOOR, AND AKBAR HAD BEEN ARRESTED
FOR TREASONOUS PLOTTING AGAINST THE REVOLUTION. WE THINK QADER
MIGHT HAVE BEEN ARRESTED SHORTLY BEFORE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT. SHSHPOOR

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WAS PROBABLY PICKED UP ON OR BEFORE AUGUST 15. DR. AKBAR,
AS NOTED ABOVE, HAD BEEN SEIZED MUCH EARLIER, PER-
HAPS AUGUST 5. ON AUGUST 23, THE ARRESTS OF PLANNING MINISTER KISHTM
AND
AND PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER RAFIE WERE ANNOUNCED, AND ALL FIVE MEN WERE
LINKED TOGETHER AS FELLOW PLOTTERS, IN "TREASONOUS AND CRIMINAL"
INTRIGUE" WITH THE "INTERNAL AND FOREIGN ENEMIES OF AFGHANISTAN'S
PEOPLE." IN KABUL 6808, THE RUMORED REMOVAL OF INTERIOR MINISTER
MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER SAYED MOHAMMED
BULABZOI WERE ALSO REPORTED. WE THINK THERE
IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT WATANJAR MIGHT INDEED HAVE BEEN SIDETRACKED,
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BUT THE REGIME HAS DECIDED NOT TO ANNOUNCE IT YET. WE REMAIN UN-
CONVINCED THAT GULABZOI HAS BEEN AFFECTED THUS FAR. HE HAS APPEARED
TO BE PARTICULARLY CLOSE TO TARAKI AND AMIN.

5. POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE ACCUSED:

THE GENERAL IMAGE OF QADER WHICH HAD EMERGED AFTER HIS FOUR MONTHS
OF PROMINENCE WAS THAT OF A DEDICATED MILITARY OFFICER WHO PROBABLY
HARBORED STRONGER NATIONALIST CONVICTIONS THAN DID
MOST OF HIS CIVILIAN COLLEAGUES IN THE LEADERSHIP. THERE WAS NO
DOUBT, HOWEVER, OF HIS LEFTIST LEANINGS; HE ONCE CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN
A MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA)
FOR THIRTEEN YEARS. QADER APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ANSWER
TO AFGHANISTAN'S MYRIAD PROBLEMS COULD BE FOUND BY A LEFTIST AND
PROGRESSIVE REGIME, BUT ONE WHICH RETAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE AND
AFGHAN CHARACTERISTICS. SOON AFTER THE APRIL REVOLUTION, RUMORS
CIRCULATED THAT QADER, VIRTUALLY ALONE AMONG THE LEADERSHIP, RESISTED
THE REGIME'S DEEPENING TIES WITH MOSCOW, AND IT WAS SUPPOSEDLY
QADER WHO PRECIPITATED THE EXILE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MORE PRO-
SOVIET PARCHAM FACTION OF THE PDPA.

6. QADER, HOWEVER, WAS EVIDENTLY A POLITICAL NOVICE AND OUT OF HIS
ELEMENT WHEN IT CAME TO COMPETING WITH LIFE-LONG POLITICAL INTRIGUERS
LIKE TARAKI AND AMIN. QADER WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A MAN OF ACTION --
AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS PARTICIPATION IN FORMER PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD
DAOUD'S COUP OF 1973, AND HIS CRUCIAL ROLE IN APRIL -- WHICH, IN
CONJUNCTION WITH HIS POTENTIAL APPEAL TO MORE CENTRIST GROUPS WITHIN
THE COUNTRY, MAY HAVE ENGENDERED SINCERE CONCERN AMONG
THE PARTY'S CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP THAT QADER MIGHT SOMEDAY ASSUME A
"MAN ON HORSEBACK" ROLE. FOR PROBABLY THOSE REASONS, THAN FOR ANY
EVIDENCE OF QADER'S INVOLVEMENT IN ACTUAL COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY
PLOTING, TARAKI AND HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS DECIDED TO MOUNT A PEREMPTIVE

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MOVE AGAINST QADER AND WHATEVER FOLLOWERS HE MAY HAVE HAD IN THE
MILITARY.

7. GENERAL SHAHPOOR REMAINS ESSENTIALLY AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY.
REGARDED MORE AS A "PROGRESSIVE" THAN AS A DOCTRINAIRE
LEFTIST, HE WAS ONE OF THE FEW PRE-COUP SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS
TO HAVE BEEN REAPPOINTED BY THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN APRIL.
IN HIS FOUR MONTHS AS CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, SHAHPOOR HAD OVERTLY

TAKEN A BASICALLY APOLITICAL STANCE, ALTHOUGH HIS NAME HAD BEEN MEN-
TIONED TO US AS LINKED TO A COVERT, ANTI-REGIME OPPOSITION-

IST GROUP. THE REGIME CONCEIVABLY UNCOVERED INDICATIONS OF INDISCRETION ON SHAHPOOR'S PART, AND COULD HAVE USED THIS "EVIDENCE" AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AGAINST THE MILITARY IN GENERAL, AND QADER IN PARTICULAR.

8. KISHTMAND, ONE OF THE TWO SHI'A HAZARAS IN THE CABINET, WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE SOME PARACHAMIST LEANINGS IN THE PAST, BUT, SINCE ASSUMING HIS MINISTERIAL POSITION, HAD BEEN REGARDED AS LOYAL TO THE KHALQIST LEADERSHIP. HE WAS NOT, HOWEVER, A MEMBER OF THE 8-MAN POLITBURO.

9. RAFIE, AN ARMY MAJOR AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION, WAS, WITH QADER AND WATANJAR, ONE OF THE FEW MILITARY MEN IN THE CABINET. LISTED NEAR THE END OF THE CABINET PECKING ORDER, RAFIE EXERCISED LITTLE DISCERNIBLE INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. LIKE HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES, HE HAD BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE PDPA CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITBURO.

10. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIME: THESE PURGES UNDERSCORE THE FACT

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THAT THE KHALIQIST REGIME IS MOVING MUCH MORE QUICKLY AGAINST ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED OPPOSITION GROUPS THAN MOST OBSERVERS HAD ANTICIPATED. THE EARLIER PURGING OF THE PARCHAMIST FACTION HAD OCCURRED SOMEWHAT AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. THE ELIMINATION OF THE MORE NATIONALIST ELEMENTS IN

THE ARMED FORCES, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY QADER, WAS TO BE EXPECTED EVENTUALLY, BUT MANY HAD BELIEVED THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT OCCUR FOR MANY MORE MONTHS. WHAT HAS HAPPENED COULD CONCEIVABLY REFLECT A GREAT SENSE OF INSECURITY BY TARAKI AND AMIN WHO THUS CHOSE

TO LASH OUT PRECIPITATELY AT ALL OPPONENTS, REAL OR IMAGINED. IN
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OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THESE PURGES WITH APPARENT IMPUNITY DEMONSTRATES ITS CONTROL SO FAR OVER THE INSTRU-

MENTS OF POWER: THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE. ALTHOUGH A DELAYED REACTION WITHIN THE MILITARY TO THESE ARRESTS COULD BREAK OUT ANYTIME, THE TOP KHALIQIST LEADERS ARE IN CONTROL AT THE MOMENT.

11. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PARCHAM AND QADER PURGES ALSO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE REGIME HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF SUPPORT SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS, AND, IN FACT, THIS BASE MAY INDEED BE SHRINKING. THE MASSES OF THE POPULATION,

GIVEN THEIR TRADITIONALISTIC AND ISLAMIC VIEWS, PROBABLY REPRESENT A LOST CAUSE FOR THE TARAKI REGIME, BUT THE MASSES HAVE NEVER PLAYED A VITAL POLITICAL ROLE IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS. THE EXTREME RIGHT, AS EMBODIED BY THE IKHWAN-I-MUSLIMIN (MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD) AND THE THOUSANDS OF CONSERVATIVE MULLAHS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, ARE APPARENTLY IMPLACABLE FOES OF THIS REGIME, BUT ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS ARE NOT THE FORTE OF THESE GROUPS. IN OUR VIEW, A WELL-ORGANIZED, WELL-ARMED FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED TO OVERTHROW THE KHALIQIST REGIME. INDIVIDUAL ASSASSINATIONS AND ACTS OF TERRORISM, HOWEVER, ARE THE HALLMARK OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND SUCH ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE REGIME'S REPRESENTATIVES MAY BECOME A RELATIVELY COMMON OCCURRENCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EVEN THOUGH THE ALIENATION OF THE "FURTHER LEFTIST" PARCHAMISTS AND THE LEFTIST-NATIONALIST MILITARY HAVE FURTHER REDUCED THE REGIME'S

"NATURAL" BASE OF SUPPORT, THE KHALIQIST LEADERS CAN EVIDENTLY STILL RELY COMPLETELY ON THE OFFICERS WHO DIRECTLY COMMAND THE TANKS AND PLANES, AND THE LATTER REMAIN THE CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE AFGHAN POLITICAL EQUATION. AS LONG AS THIS GROUP, MOST NOTABLY THE YOUNGER CAPTAINS, MAJORS, AND COLONELS, REMAINS LOYAL, THE REGIME WILL PROBABLY NOT ENCOUNTER ANY SERIOUS ORGANIZED THREAT, AND, THEREFORE
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COULD REMAIN IN POWER FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE PRESUME THAT THE NUMEROUS SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS NOW OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE UNITS OF THE AFGHAN ARMED FORCES WILL DO THEIR PART TO ENSURE THE RELIABILITY OF THE TANKERS AND PILOTS.

12. WE ANTICIPATE FURTHER POLITICAL TURBULENCE. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS WILL PROBABLY BE MOUNTED BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, PROVOKED,

INTER ALIA, BY PERSISTENT REPORTS THAT A WIDESPREAD ARREST PROGRAM AIMED AT MULLAHS IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT AMIN IS A PRIME TARGET FOR THE IKHWAN, WHICH IS PATIENTLY WAITING FOR A "CLOSE, CERTAIN SHOT." CONTINUED INTERECINE MANEUVERING WITHIN THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IS THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE OF FURTHER INSTABILITY, AND A SPLIT BETWEEN TARAKI AND AMIN IS BY NO MEANS OUT OF THE QUESTION.

A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE THAT AMIN, EVEN NOW, IS THE REAL POLITICAL POWER IN THE COUNTRY, DESPITE THE ONGOING CONSTRUCTION OF A "CULT OF PERSONALITY" AROUND TARAKI, WHO IS BILLED AS "THE SON OF THE PEOPLE." AMIN'S OBVIOUS AND POSSIBLY LIMITLESS AMBITION COULD PROVOKE A SHOWDOWN

BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AT SOME POINT, ALTHOUGH THE TWO SEEM CLOSE AND GIVEN TARAKI'S AGE AND REPORTED POOR HEALTH, TIME IS ON AMIN'S SIDE. FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER, THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE PREOCCUPIED WITH SUPPRESSING ANY REACTION WHICH MAY OCCUR TO THEIR MOST

RECENT PURGE.

13. A POSSIBLE DILEMMA FOR THE SOVIETS. THE REGIME'S NARROWING BASE OF SUPPORT COULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THIS COUNTRY, SINCE THE PARTY LEADERSHIP NOW HAS ONLY ITSELF AND A RUMP CORPS OF THE AFGHAN MILITARY UPON WHICH IT CAN RELY. SHOULD THE LATTER'S LYALITY BEGIN TO WAIVER, THE REGIME MIGHT HAVE TO TURN NORTHWARD FOR EFFECTIVE HELP. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW COULD UTILIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE ITS DIRECT CONTROL SOUTH OF THE OXUS, WE PRESUME MOSCOW WOULD PREFER NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE FACED WITH AN AFGHAN REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE ITS OTHER
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BILATERAL POLICIES IN THIS REGION AT THIS TIME. THIS POSSIBLE SOVIET
RELUCTANCE TO BECOME INVOLVED TOO DEEPLY CONCEIVABLY COULD BE REF-
LECTED IN THE QUICKENING PACE WITH WHICH POSSIBLE OPPOSITION GROUPS
ARE BEING WEEDED OUT BY THE REGIME.

14. THE ACTUAL SOVIET ROLE IN THESE INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
CAN ONLY BE GUESSED AT AT THIS TIME. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE EVIDENCE WE

HAVE TO WEIGH IS THE STORY OF A MEMBER OF THE AFGHAN MILITARY WHO TOLD

US SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY SEEN A LETTER FROM TARAKI,
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ADDRESSED TO ALL AFGHAN OFFICERS, DIRECTING THEM TO FOLLOW ANY AND ALL
ORDERS FROM THE SOVIET ADVISORS ATTACHED TO THE ARMED FORCES. REFUSAL
OR RELUCTANCE TO DO SO WOULD BE PUNISHABLE BY DEATH, ACCORDING TO THIS

PARTICULAR REPORT. ALTHOUGH THIS STORY HAS NOT BEEN SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY OTHER SOURCE, THE SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL WAY IN WHICH QADER AND HIS "FELLOW PLOTTERS" WERE ELIMINATED, AND THE CONFIDENCE WITH WHICH THE REGIME APPROACHED THIS OPERATION (AS REFLECTED BY THE FACT THAT SECURITY MEASURES IN KABUL WERE ONLY MINIMALLY INCREASED DURING RECENT DAYS) COULD REFLECT A CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES WHICH MAY TRANSCEND THE REGULAR AFGHAN CHAIN-OF-COMMAND. AT ANY RATE, THE SOVIET CONNECTION REMAINS A CRITICAL ONE FOR TARAKI'S REGIME. THIS WAS ILLUSTRATED BY THE PRESS TREATMENT OF THE AUGUST 19 INDEPENDENCE DAY CEREMONIES, WHEREBY THE ONLY MEN PICTURED ON LOCAL NEWSPAPERS' FRONT PAGES SINGING THE OFFICIAL CONGRATULATORY BOOK WERE AMIN AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER PUZANOV (THE "REAL MINISTER OF DEFENSE," ACCORDING TO SOME LOCAL WAGS).

15. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS IS MIXED:

ALTHOUGH THE MOST RECENT PURGE IS MORE DIRECTLY SIGNIFICANT FOR OTHER ACTORS, DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL, OUR OWN INTERESTS COULD BE AFFECTED BY THE FALL-OUT. THE ELIMINATION OF THE MORE NATIONALISTIC ELEMENT FROM THE POLITICAL EQUATION COULD RESULT IN INCREASED RELIANCE

ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ADOPTION OF EVEN MORE LEFTIST, LESS TRYLY NON-ALIGNED POLICIES, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND IN THE FOREIGN FIELD. THE ENHANCED POWER OF AMIN ALSO DOES NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY AUGUR WELL FOR OUR POSITION, SINCE THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN RELUCTANT TO SHOW HIS RADICAL COLORS AT SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THE REGIME SOON

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BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH SOME GENUINE LONG-TERM DOMESTIC STABILITY, IT CONCEIVABLY COULD BEGIN FOCUSING MORE ATTENTION ON ITS MUCH PUBLICIZED REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, WHICH COULD, THEREBY, CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND PERHAPS CALM SOME JITTERS IN NEIGHBORING IRAN AND PAKISTAN. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, THE FALL OF QADER AND POSSIBLY, THE ELIMINATION OF LIKE-MINDED ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY, IS NOT A REASSURING DEVELOPMENT, GIVEN THE PROBABLY ASCENDANCY OF AMIN AND THE POSSIBLY ENHANCED SOVIET POSITION. ONE FURTHER OMINOUS NOTE IS BEING STRUCK BY THE RUMORS REPORTEDLY BEING SPREAD IN THE BAZAAR BY GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ALLEGING THAT THE U.S. WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PLOT WITH QADER, ALTHOUGH NO DETAILS REGARDING HOW OR WHY WE WERE INVOLVED ARE PROVIDED BY THESE STORIES.

16. THE FUTURE. OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS SINCE THE ARRESTS, THE REGIME

HAS MOUNTED A MASSIVE NATION-WIDE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN PILLORYING QADER AND HIS ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS, CLAIMING THAT THEIR PLOT WAS SUPPORTED BY UNNAMED DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN

FORCES OF REACTION (PAST AFGHAN RULERS ALSO HAVE PLAYED UPON THE

TRADITIONAL XENOPHOBIA OF THIS COUNTRY). ONE OBVIOUS TARGET OF THIS PROPAGANDA EFFORT IS ANYONE EITHER WITHIN OR WITHOUT THE MILITARY WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO UNDERTAKE SIMILAR "TREASONOUS" ACTIVITIES. AT THE MOMENT, THE MILITARY APPARENTLY REMAINS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE REGIME; INDEED SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN PLEASED THAT THE REMOVAL OF SO MANY SUPERIORS HAS OPENED UP PROMOTION POSSIBILITIES. THE REGIME'S BASE OF SUPPORT HAS, HOWEVER, BECOME NARROWER, AND APPEARS TO REST NOW ON THE TWIN PILLARS OF THE SO FAR DOCILE AFGHAN MILITARY AND SOVIET SUPPORT. AS LONG AS THESE TWO SOURCES

OF STRENGTH REMAIN RELIABLE, A SERIOUS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME WOULD APPEAR UNLIKELY TO DEVELOP, ALTHOUGH FURTHER CHALLENGES ARE CLEARLY ON THE HORIZON.

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